Gas leak at Nord Stream 2 pipeline as seen from a Danish F-16 interceptor near Bornholm, Denmark on 27 September 2022.

Hybrid warfare paints ‘gray zone’ targets on shipping and offshore energy infrastructure

Safety

With the swift surge in geopolitical upheavals, a rising tide of offshore security risks is playing out across the globe, putting vessels, undersea cables, and offshore oil and gas installations in danger of increasingly becoming sitting ducks for “gray zone” attacks, which WTW, an advisory, broking, and solutions company, interprets as actions used to weaken a country by any means short of an all-out war.

Gas leak at Nord Stream 2 pipeline as seen from a Danish F-16 interceptor near Bornholm, Denmark on 27 September 2022.

According to the latest Political Risk Index from WTW, the growing threat to offshore energy infrastructure and ships is on the rise, stemming from the availability of advanced weapons and the willingness of certain states to disregard international maritime laws. The report singled out Russia and Iran as countries among the ones willing to use ‘gray zone aggression’ tactics to disrupt the state of affairs in other countries.

Samuel Wilkin, Director of Political Risk Analytics at WTW, highlighted “Without insurance, many ships will not sail and planes will not fly, so improving our understanding of gray zone risks is vital for the protection of people and assets and the health of global commerce.”

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Developed with input from WTW’s marine and aerospace teams, sectors considered vulnerable to gray zone attacks, alongside support from the WTW Research Network and the crisis management team, the index addresses gray zone aggression and global security risks.

The index follows the firm’s annual political risk survey published earlier this year, which found geopolitically related supply chain disruptions affected 69% of respondents in 2024, including gray zone attacks on global shipping.

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Furthermore, the research spotlights three primary types of gray zone flashpoints: military conflicts and rivalries, such as in Ukraine and the South China Sea; fragile states like Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq; and ideological polarization, including alleged political interference in Latin American elections.

WTW points out that examples of hybrid warfare include the destruction of critical infrastructure, state cyberattacks, weaponization of migration, sponsorship of violent non-state actors, disinformation campaigns, and declared or undeclared economic sanctions.

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Michael Rühle and Julijus Grubliauskas wrote in their paper, ‘Energy as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare,’ about such trends, underscoring: “The Ukraine crisis offers some important energy security lessons: when it comes to energy, geography is still destiny. Pipelines still mean both economic and political power. The struggle between Moscow and Kiev over the price of gas is more instructive in this regard than a thousand economy textbooks.

“The Ukraine crisis was also a reminder that energy security is an integral part of national security; that dependence on Russia can be a strategic liability; and that interdependence between the producer and the consumer will not encourage stability, as long as the producer can go longer without revenue than the consumer can go without gas. But there is more.”

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Based on the findings of this report, there is an increasing trend in gray zone activities, partly driven by rising middle powers operating with limited military budgets. The research shows that marine assets are at risk with the global shadow fleet, which has grown exponentially since Russia began using it to export oil, identified as another threat in the report.

The report notes that these vessels lack standard P&I insurance, do not undergo regular maintenance, and habitually alter their AIS signals. This brings insurance impact to the fore since gray zone attacks are causing exclusions and cancellations of insurance coverage, leading to disruptions and rerouting, affecting businesses reliant on timely shipping. However, trade disruption insurance is said to offer some recourse for impacted companies.

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Jared Seth, Managing Director, Global Aviation and Space at WTW, commented: “Insurance relies on precise language, so the implications of ambiguous gray zone activities can be challenging.”

The report also identifies an aerospace threat arising from an increasing possibility for the aerospace sector to become a key gray zone target, with attacks such as GPS jamming and spoofing already taking place.

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Wilkin emphasized: “These attacks appear to have soared in recent years, for many reasons. One reason is that countries that are deeply interconnected by globalisation increasingly find themselves in adversarial relationships, and these deep interconnections offer many avenues for gray zone action, especially actions directed at globalised businesses.

“Another reason is that new technologies have enabled gray zone actions, including cyber-attacks and remote attacks by drones. Hybrid warfare is likely to continue to rise and evolve, so insurers need to be able to understand the implications of ambiguous gray zone activities to properly assess risk.”

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The Balticconnector incident from last year was only one of many recent incidents where subsea infrastructure was damaged. Another one that made the headlines in September 2022 involved four gas leaks found on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, two in Sweden’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and two in Danish territory.

After the Norwegian and Swedish seismic institutes had confirmed that underwater blasts preceded the leaks, European authorities said that the incident could be the result of “deliberate actions.” Come July 2023, Germany revealed in a letter to the UN Security Council that it found traces of subsea explosives in samples taken from a yacht.

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Rühle and Grubliauskas outlined: “To destabilize Ukraine, Russia applied a combination of military, semi-military and strategic communication tools. But it also managed to integrate energy (via the expropriation of Ukrainian energy assets and pressure on gas prices) into this strategy.

Hence, if NATO wants to be serious about countering ‘hybrid threats,’ it must include energy in the equation. This will require NATO to enhance discussions on the security implications of energy issues, and step up Allied political dialogue and strategic analysis in line with the emerging environment.”